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Abstract 
The importance of long-term public finance sustainability in the context of current fi-
nancial crisis is still seen as one of the basic factors of economic stability. Demographic 
development resulting in higher percentage of people in retirement age versus economi-
cally active people is one of the main risks. There is a growing pressure on expenditures 
of age-related systems. For this reason the pension scheme reforms are major issue in 
advanced countries. While some countries have chosen strictly regulated approach 
towards pension reform, some have given its citizens a choice whether to stay in the old 
system, or whether to switch to a new one. Such a decision is very complex and whenever 
the choice was implemented, many more workers switched to a new system than was ex-
pected.  
In our paper, we present a micro-based simulation model for the Czech Republic that 
allows us to model the individuals’ switching decision using several economic and be-
havioral factors within an old (PAYG DB) and new (FDC) systems. It allows us to esti-
mate the proportion of people who would opt-out to a funded pillar. 
Our results indicate that under the assumption of rationality and long run predictabili- 
ty of most parameters, only a small fraction of population would choose the multi-pillar 
scheme. However, this conclusion holds only under a full rationality. Once we relax this 
assumption, a wide range of switching strategies become viable. Therefore, the expecta-
tions that the switch will be popular cannot be based only on economic factors, but must 
also incorporate behavioral aspects, such as the risk of aversion. 
1. Introduction 
Public pension schemes in developed countries are among the most important 
existing redistributive programs. Their aim is to provide a long-term security of in-
come for individuals in the situations when they are no longer gainfully employed. 
Due to the circumstances of their creation, the resulting systems were mostly based 
on pay-as-you-go (PAYG) scheme. It was administratively simpler and more trans-
parent for an individual to base the pension system on the defined benefits (DB) de-
sign, where the final pension depends on the wage profile. Other retirement schemes 
were also created – a fully funded (FF) scheme based on the rule of defined contri-
butions (DC), where the final pension depends on invested sum as well as on invest-
ment returns. 
Extension of the social state in the second half of the 20th Century together 
with a steeply growing life expectancy and a shift in the existing demographic pattern 
led to the changes in originally small old-age pension plans into the most important 
expenditure item of public budgets. At the end of the 20th Century financing of these 
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plans appeared to be unsustainable and the governments had to respond to the sit-
uation by introducing reforms. This process did not progress at the same pace. Not 
a single country proposed anything like “a universal model of the reform“, which 
could (with minor modifications) be copied and transferred from one country to an-
other. 
Old-age pension system in the CR evolved in a manner similar to some de-
veloped countries. In the first half of the 20th Century a great variety of different 
schemes came into being (in the sense of setting redistribution rules) for different 
groups of persons (employees). Subsequently, under the Communist rule, they were 
extended and integrated into a single universal old-age pension scheme. Reforms 
which were to respond to the deteriorating demographic situation were launched only 
after the transformation of the centrally planned economy (CPE) to the market econ-
omy began (political economy of pension reform in the Czech Republic during the 90s 
can be found in Müller, 2002), whereas reforms in developed countries gradually 
started in the 80s (for detailed summary see Immergut, Anderson, Schulze, 2006). 
One of the objectives of the Czech pension system reform in the last two dec-
ades has been to address the issue of long-term sustainability of the scheme. Govern-
ment used to tackle this problem using mainly parametric modifications of the exist-
ing scheme. The 1966 reform attempted to stabilize the system’s budget and to  
re-introduce the merit principle and diversification of funding. Klimentová (1998) 
discusses main changes in the Czech pension system until 1996. 
Even while the reform in 1996 was being implemented, the demographic de-
velopments quickly rendered it insufficient. However, the more systemic reform 
which would enable a greater intervention in the existing system and generate alter-
native pension pillar schemes lacked a political consensus in the long run develop-
ment of the pension system. A step towards consensus was the so-called BezdČk 
Commission in 2005 which was set up by the government to explore potential 
impacts of political parties’ proposals of a systemic reform of the old-age pension 
scheme. The Commission (BezdČk et al., 2005:88) highlighted differences in the po-
litical parties’ proposals, but it has not led to any further convergence in pension 
reform agenda and thus the Czech Republic still relies on a classical PAYG system 
with a negligible impact of funded (private and voluntary) pillar. 
Our paper discusses effects of an hypothetical pension reform in the Czech 
Republic that would introduce the voluntary funded pillar and allow to opt-out from 
the existing purely PAYG and government run system. It is not our objective to dis-
cuss the necessity or risks of this pillar. Instead, we focus on the method used for 
people choosing to opt-out from the mandatory insurance. The focal point of our con-
tribution lies in finding an answer to the question how many people will opt-out  
of the FDC pillar when they are allowed. Solving this problem can help in finding  
the suitable transformation method of the existing one-pillar system into a two-pil- 
lar one (the pillar of the voluntary supplementary pension insurance, called the third 
pillar is not discussed here). This problem had already been dealt with by Ježek in 
the Czech Republic (see Ježek, 2003), who compared the difference between replace-
ment ratio (pension as a percentage of the preretirement wage) one can expect from 
the already existing PAYG DB system and replacement ratio one could get if   
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two aspects. First, we use updated estimates of main economic variables used in 
the model. Second, we attempt to evaluate the impact of irrational decision of an in-
dividual. This is not the case of neither our or Ježek´s model as our individual is 
strictly rational. However, our model tests the possible situation of repercussion, 
where the individual (for a number of reasons discussed below) does not behave ra-
tionally. The Ježek´s approach results (compared to ours) lead to the conclusion that 
switch is more beneficial for larger group of people. Some reasons for this difference 
are discussed in the Conclusion. 
The first part of the article (Section 2) will indicate phases of the reform where 
opting- out could be incorporated and what factors influence an individual to opt-out. 
The following part (Section 3) formalizes the influence of the factors discussed in 
the  previous part using a mathematical micro-simulation model. In the next part 
(Section  4) we perform sensitivity analysis which purpose is to demonstrate how 
individual’s decision to opt-out changes according to the set of defined factors. Our 
results indicate that under the assumption of rationality and long run predictability of 
most parameters only a small fraction of population would choose the multi-pillar 
scheme. However, this conclusion holds only under a full rationality. Once we relax 
this assumption, a wide range of switching strategies become viable. Therefore, the ex-
pectations that the switch will be popular cannot be based on economic factors only, 
but must also incorporate behavioral aspects, such as the risk of aversion. 
2. Pure Opt-Out and a Degree of Freedom of an Individual in Its Particular 
Areas
In 1975 the Great Britain was one of the first countries where people could 
choose to opt-out of the state-guaranteed pillar when they were not members of 
a contracted-out occupational scheme. In this situation they can join the FDC pillar 
administered by the private sector. Schulze and Moran (2006:60) say: “Employers 
had the possibility of contracting-out of SERPS, thereby receiving a rebate of the state 
pension contribution, if the  occupational scheme they offered guaranteed benefits   
at least equal to the SERPS. ”Two terms – to contract-out and to opt-out (and all its 
derivatives such as contracting-out or opting-out) – have been used in the similar 
context. We understand the term to opt-out in the same manner, i.e. the choice of 
an individual not to be involved, not to participate in something. “Opting-out from 
the  basic pension scheme” is therefore further interpreted as a  maximum freedom   
of an  individual to decide whether to participate in the  emerging second pillar. 
The opposite approach, in which a person has no choice to influence his/her part in 
the second pillar, is called the state-controlled transformation. The state controlled 
transformation means that the  state takes away the  option of personal choice and 
implements the approved form of the reform. 
We argue that a real transformation (systemic reform) usually consists of sever-
al steps and the state has a possibility to provide an individual with a choice in some 
areas, while other areas are strictly controlled. The systemic reform than could provide 
the following areas where a varying degree of freedom could be applied: (1) freedom  
to join the FDC pillar, (2) the percentage of the opt-out rate, (3) the choice of a pension 
savings provider to accumulate pension assets, including a selection of the trade offs 
between gains and risks, (4) the choice when to retire and when to start drawing pen-312                                  Finance a úvČr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 4 
sion benefits from the FDC system, (5) the choice what to do with the pension assets 
upon retirement. Although the overall outline of the reform usually lies somewhere 
between the pure opt-out and state-controlled transformation, Palacios, Whitehouse 
(1998) showed that both pure opt-out and state-controlled transformation variants 
have been applied.
1  
Due to the spread of introducing the contribution based schemes into pension 
systems in the world, large volume of studies concerning the topic can be found. 
Most of them deal with the pros and cons (benefits and costs) of introducing such 
a scheme. (In the case of CR see e.g. Kreidl, 1998; Kubalþík, ZboĜil, 2000, BezdČk, 
2001 or Ježek, 2003). But as we stated before, the purpose of our article is different. 
We work with an  assumption that the  second pillar will be introduced in the  CR 
(the decision has been made). The focal point of our contribution lies in finding a suit-
able method of how to transform the existing one-pillar system into a two-pillar one. 
Similar approaches to ours are applied only for rather small part of the popu-
lation. There are inspirational studies by Richard Disney and Carl Emmerson (Disney 
et al., 2001 or Emmerson, 2001) for the UK. Significant debate is devoted also to 
401(k) program in the U.S.A. (see Miller et al., 2009). But most of these studies 
usually take the form of ex-post analysis of who has opted-out stemming from demo-
graphic principles. We argue that our approach is innovative in respect of ex ante 
analysis based on income, rather than on demographic principle.  
3. Factors Affecting Jobholder’s Opt-out 
The individual’s decision about opting-out can be simplified by comparing 
the  loss of pension income that an  individual will not be paid from the  existing 
PAYG system with the pension income from the FDC pillar. We assume that in-
dividual i will opt-out if the following condition is satisfied:
2  
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where 
i
FDC P  is the opted-out individual pension from the FDC system, ǻ
i
PAYG P  is 
the loss of pension from the existing PAYG in case of individual’s opt out and 
i RI  
we call the rationality index. Furthermore, we assume that the decision is made in 
particular year (2010 in our model) and only by individuals who are currently (in 
the year mentioned above) on the labor market. 
The Section 3.1 presents micro simulation model of profit and loss of pension 
benefits from the subsequent pillars. In the following Section 3.2 we discuss the para-
meters which could be taken into account by an individual when evaluating the ad-
vantages of opting-out. Therefore our analysis could take two forms. First approach 
could be based on rational assessment of financial advantages of a new arrangement. 
1 They mention Argentina, Colombia or Peru as examples of pure opt-out variant and Bolivia, Kazakhstan 
or Mexico as examples of (pure) state transformation. For more comprehensive overview of current pen-
sion schemes in the OECD countries see OECD (2004). 
2 This model and the following ones are described in greater detail in the Appendix. Our model is similar to 
the one used by Disney, Palacios, Whitehouse (1999), who examine the welfare consequences of partial 
shift from a public unfunded scheme to a private scheme both from an individual and a macroeconomic 
perspective in the UK. The earlier analyses based on the same model of individual responses to privati-
zation of the social security system in the USA can be found in Gustman, Steinmeier (1995). Finance a úvČr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 4                                           313 
But we argue that in reality people do not make a decision only on the basis of finite 
amount of financial parameters. Their decision making process might be more com-
plex and may involve more inputs. Therefore we use a second approach where the ra-
tionality index is introduced to the model. The index suggests that individual may 
choose to opt-out even if that would result in (not a large) drop in his overall pension 
amount. Rationality index and overall influence of individual’s (ir)rationality in 
the decision-making is further discussed in the Section 3.3. 
3.1 The Model Assessing Advantages of Opting-out of the PAYG System 
3.1.1 The Model of Pension from the FDC Pillar 
To calculate the pension which an opted-out individual receives from the FDC 
system, some simple financial-mathematical relationships can be applied. Since the FDC 
model is characterized by full equivalence, it must be true that what is saved in the sys-
tem is later drawn from the system in the form of pension benefits. For the sake of 
simplicity, we assume that an individual draws a life annuity from the FDC system. 
Based on the equivalence principle, an individual’s pension equals: 
 12 ,, , , ,
ii
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where 
i W  is the gross wage during the saving phase,  FDC cr
 is the contribution rate to 
the FDC pillar, r the real appreciation rate of pension savings, v is the adjustment of 
paid out pension, n1 is the length of gainful employment and n2 is the life expectancy 
of the average individual of particular age cohort at the moment of retirement. 
3.1.2 Loss of Pension from the PAYG Pillar 
By opting-out the individual accepts the fact that his/her income from the pay- 
-as-you-go system will drop. This drop (ǻ
i
PAYG P ) is given by the formula: 
    1 ǻ *, , , , , , , , ,
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PAYG P  is the original (non-opted-out) pension, 
i
OPT OUT I   is the share of opted- 
-out pension from PAYG on total (potential) PAYG pension, rh and rr are the re-
duction limits for calculating the percentage-based assessment, RA is the statutory 
retirement age and ncp characterizes the definition and method of inclusion of non- 
-contributory periods. The symbol 
i
FDC n  denotes the saving period in FDC system of 
the individual, cr is the original rate paid to the PAYG and the coefficient T char-
acterizes the pension reduction from the PAYG system in case of opting-out.
3 
8 In our model we assume that the reduction will be proportional to the extent of opting-out and will be uni-
form for everybody. It means that the coefficient T is assumed to reach a unit value. Alternatively, we could 
suppose that the coefficient will (1) change in time, or (2) vary according to the individual’s income, and 
(3) be different for a person during various stages of his/her lifespan. In this perspective our model does not
involve any alternative scenarios. The system of accrued pension rights reduction is one part of switching
conditions and should be decided politically. “Over restriction” might be the way to reduce transformation 
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Parameters estimating the development of labor productivity, inflation rate, 
number of employees and gross national product (GNP) are crucial macroeconomic 
data and they appear practically in all models. Projected development of these para-
meters has been mainly taken from the Final Report of the Executive Team. As we 
expect that a different macroeconomic development will not significantly influence 
the decision-making about opting-out, we do not derive alternative macroeconomic 
framework. 
Another significant parameter which is taken for granted without further dis-
cussion is the contribution rate (cr). The value of 21% (old-age pensions) has been 
used in our models instead of the total 28% current contribution rate (21% instead of 
28% correspond to the fact that 73.5% of pension’s expenditure in 2008 represented 
old age pensions, the rest belonged to disability, widow, widower and orphan pen-
sions which are not matter of this article – similar concept can be found in Ježek, 
2003:521). All other comparisons are related to the contribution rate which has been 
determined in this manner. 
3.2 What Influences the Anticipated Pension from the PAYG DB and FDC 
Pillar 
3.2.1 Level and Development of Wages (W
i)
The overall impact is examined for 200 model individuals who represent par-
ticular income percentiles (100 for men and 100 for women). For this reason it is also 
important to include projections of changes in income differentiation into the ac- 
tual calculation of wages of the individual W
i in a given income percentile.
4 Pensions 
from the FDC pillar are affected by the earnings during the whole gainful em-
ployment, while in the DB pillar the earnings taken during the relevant period (last 
30 years) are decisive. That is why income differentiation may influence the level  
of pension from both systems. In our model we expect the income differentiation 
measured by the decile ratio of wages to be at the level 3.5 in the year 2050.
5 Ac-
cording to OECD (2009a) statistics the indicator falls between 3.0 and 4.0 in vast ma-
jority of countries, with some countries reaching the level of 5.0 (Hungary, USA) and 
in some countries, on the other hand, the level of 2.0 (Belgium, Sweden, Finland, Den-
mark). The model sensitivity analysis did not reveal any major influence of the income 
differentiation development. That is why this analysis was not discussed in the follow- 
-up text any longer. Although, this does not affect the fact that wage differentiation 
development may influence the further evolution of PAYG DB system. The patterns 
modeling the  wage development together with the  wage projection until the  year 
2050 can be found in the Appendix. Furthermore, it is assumed that a person’s in-
come moves around a certain unchanged income level (appropriate income percen-
tile) through the whole career. Average wage growth is taken from the data provided 
by the Team of Experts. The data are based on assumed wage growth in EU countries 
together with the speed of convergence of the Czech economy with the EU countries. 
4 Source is a publication of the Czech Statistical Office about wage differentiation in 2008 (CSO, 2009) 
and also the data acquired from our models. 
5 This means that in 2050 the wage of the ninth income decile is 3.5 times higher than the wage of the first 
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3.2.2 Opt-out Contribution Rate in the FDC Model (cr
FDC)
The level of contribution rate in the FDC system naturally determines the ex-
tent of opting-out. It can be generally assumed that the level of this rate may vary in 
the course of the working career and so cr
FDC represents a vector of rates rather than 
a single concrete value. The model enables us to express the advantages of opting-out 
for a contribution rate variant. Concrete values of opt-out percentage are essentially 
influenced by the macroeconomic framework of the reform. It can be assumed that 
opting-out is largely determined by the ability of the state or public finances to cover 
the cost of such changes. Kreidl (1998:39) assumed present value of the implicit pen-
sion debt
6 for the statutory pension age 65 between 180 and 230% GDP. Later IPD 
calculations (see MLSA, 2004:91, BezdČk et al., 2005:17 or MLSA, 2008:70) have 
decreased its level towards 70–120% of GDP. Introduction of FDC pillar will induce 
transformation of the IPD into explicit debt. It is hard to say what the extent of such 
transformation will be, as it is influenced by the set condition of such switch. One 
can say that one of the  most important factors are: the  opt-out contribution rate, 
number of people who opted-out to FDC or system of reduction of pension rights 
from PAYD DB. In our article we set the opt-out contribution rate at 6%, since  
we believe that such transformation would not pose serious problems with financing 
the transformation costs of transition. 
3.2.3 Estimated Return on the Pension Portfolio and Its Volatility (r)
Generally, a higher appreciation of assets in the FDC pillar will lead to a high-
er extent of opting-out. The crucial question is what will be the real appreciation of 
assets in the FDC. Can we apply historical experience to its estimate? 
According to the study of the London Business School (cited from ABM 
AMRO, 2007:5) the average annual return for the global stock markets during the past 
100 years (including reinvested dividends) was about 5.8%, 1.6% for bonds and only 
1% for public securities. Capital markets are characterized by a considerable vola-
tility. The above mentioned study (ABM AMRO, 2007:7) claims that volatility re-
duction, which may be reached by a convenient structuring of the portfolio, results  
in a drop in its average return. The latest London Business School study admitted 
the fall in the real return on the global index for equities to 5.2% caused by the fall in 
capital markets in the years 2007 and 2008 (Dimson, Marsch, Staunton, 2009:43). 
However, it has attracted attention to the fact that the main part of the aver-age return 
is being generated from reinvested dividends, capital appreciation is of lower im-
portance. 
The European Commission represented by the Economic Policy Committee 
(EPC) agreed that a long-term real rate of return of 3% will be assumed for calcu-
lations of impacts of population ageing (EPC and EC, 2005). Their sensitivity tests of 
models worked with alternative rates of 2% or 4%. 
We consider the possibility that an individual can save money in three various 
funds in his/her lifetime.
7 We have dubbed them Growth, Balanced, and Conserv-
ative. The Growth fund will have the highest average return but it is linked with 
6 Definition of IPD and its measurement is not the subject of this article and can be found e.g. in Holz-
mann, Palacios, Zviniene (2004) 
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a higher volatility. To decrease it, the individual has to transfer his pension assets 
into a fund with lower volatility (balanced or conservative) at certain point prior to 
retiring. These funds generate a lower rate of return. We test the individual’s sen-
sitivity to changing volatility by means of variants with different level of profit-
ability.  
We treat the administrative costs (annual charges) of pension saving providers 
as asset-based and we set the level at 1% of the assets value annually.
8 The impact of 
different average rate of return r on the choice of opting-out is evaluated by using 
the sensitivity analysis. We will suppose that pension savings providers will achieve 
either higher or lower rate of return on pension assets. Projected values of the alter-
natives are summarized in the Table 1 together with the values of the basic variant. 
3.2.4 Adjustment (Valorization) of Paid-out Pension Benefits (v)
In a consistently equivalent FDC model the method of adjustment of paid out 
annuities does not play any role. The retiree will get back his/her assets at the same 
level; what will change is the distribution of assets in time. Let us suppose that paid 
out pensions from both systems are adjusted according to the same rules. Since 
the rule of FDC pension adjustment cannot influence the net present value of pen-
sions paid in future, we can employ the adjustment rule from the PAYG DB pensions 
even for FDC pensions. We do so to compare the FDC pension with the loss of pen-
sion in PAYG DB. The same method was applied by Ježek (2003:518). (See for-
mula (9) and (10) in Appendices). 
3.2.5 Duration of the Saving/Insurance Period (n1) and Non-contributory 
Periods within Saving/Insurance Period (ncp)
When projecting the  duration of saving period (FDC) or insurance period 
(PAYG DB), it is vital to estimate non-contributory insurance periods (e.g. duration 
of study, unemployment, childcare or sickness). Non-contributory periods of insur-
ance affect the calculation of particular pension benefits both in the PAYG DB and 
Table 1  Projected Real Appreciation Rates in the FDC Model
Accumulation of assets – fund type 
growth  balanced  conservative   
(max. 15 years 
before retirement) 
15 to 7 years 
before retirement 
7 years before 
retirement 
Rate of return 
during annuity 
drawing 
Basic variant  4.5%  3.2%  2%  2% 
Variant with higher 
return rates  5.5%  4.2%  3%  3% 
Variant with lower 
return rate  3.5%  2.2%  1%  1% 
Source: Authors. 
8 Many kinds of charges can be applied by pension funds. These charges differ across the countries and 
pension funds. Whitehouse (2000:13, 28) uses charge ratio for overall impact of charges on pension sav-
ings. For selected Latin America countries he found that the charge ratio lies between 13.5 and 26%. In 
our model the value of the charge ratio equals 18.3% (for the individual 40 years before retirement).  
For measurement of overall impact on the level of annuity we can use Money worth ratio (MWR). Accord-
ing to James, Vittas (2000:26) MWR is mostly between 0.8 and 0.95. For CR Ježek (2003:521) uses
MWR = 0.90. In our model the value of the MWR equals 0.895 (for the male who has just retired).  Finance a úvČr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 4                                           317 
 
the FDC system. While ncp is considered as an insurance period within PAYG DB, 
FDC model does not compensate for it. Non-contributory periods in the Czech pen-
sion system have been examined by Holub, 2009. Conclusions from his research are 
summarized in the Table 2. 
According to the Table 2 above, the average length of insurance lies between 
30.7 years (women without ncp) and 44.4 years (men with all ncp). The future dura-
tion of insurance will be influenced by: (1) advancement of the retirement age (+), 
(2) increase in the length of education (-), (3) increase in impact of unemployment 
periods which did not have any significance prior to 1989 (-), (4) gradual elimination 
of generous ncp recognition in existing PAYG DB system (-). Unfortunately, we are 
not able to precisely qualify the parallel influence of the above mentioned factors on 
the total insurance (PAYG) or saving duration (FDC). Therefore, in our models we 
count on constant length of the saving period (40 years) which is considered in both 
the PAYG DB and in the FDC models and which is identical for both men and women. 
Further on we suppose that the  non-contributory period proportion throughout 
the gainful employment will be on average 10%, both for men and women. 
Alternatively we are going to test the FDC model for the impact of shorter 
(ncp = 0% both for men and women) or longer (ncp = 20% both for men and women) 
non-contributory periods, which can be interpreted in several ways: (1) the impact of 
raising the  retirement age, (2)  the  impact of changing the  approach towards non- 
-contributory periods in the PAYG DB pillar, (3) the impact of taking into account 
the non-contributory period in the FDC pillar if the state chooses to pay the contri-
butions to the FDC pillar in certain cases, (4) the impact of not considering childcare 
periods as insurance period.  
3.2.6 Duration of the Payout Annuity (n2) and Retirement Age (RA)
Duration of the payout annuity is equal to life expectancy (LE) upon retire-
ment and in this respect crucially depends on precise retirement age (RA). Factor 
(RA) appears in two forms in both models. The retirement age is stipulated by the law 
and our models work primarily with 65 years. Where possible and appropriate we 
have also made estimates for 67 years. 
However, LE depends more on the real retirement age rather than on the stat-
utory retirement age. On average people retire before they reach the statutory RA. 
Based on the existing development we have included an arbitrary projection of de-
viation from the statutory and real retirement age. In 2007 it was equal to 1.2 years 
for men and 1.33 years for women. Similar difference can be observed in other years 
as well. For the sake of simplicity the parameter has been fixed at 1 year. A potential 
development of LE in the CR is indicated in the Table 3. 
Table 2  Influence of Non-Contributory Periods (ncp) in the PAYG DB System 
Duration of insurance in years 
 
men  women  unisex 
Average insurance period  44.4  39.6  41.6 
Insurance period without ncp  36.1  30.7  33.0 
Share of ncp on average insurance period   18.7%  22.5%  20.7% 
Source: Holub (2009:486) 318                                  Finance a úvČr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 4 
 
According to the Czech Statistical Office (CSO, 2007) the life expectancy in 
2006 for 65 year-old males was 14.8 years, and for females 18 years. According to 
the recent development in European countries it can be said that the LE of 65 year- 
-old persons increases every decade by one year (see OECD, 2009b). At the moment 
nothing seems to suggest that this trend could change and that the LE will not in-
crease by further 4–5 years in the coming 50 years.
9 
Our projections of the LE are based on the life tables of the Czech Statistical 
Office (CSO, 2007). We assume that the LE of a 65 year-old person increases by 
0.1 year every year. Using this rule the LE of a 65 year-old person, regardless of sex, 
will be 20.8 years in 2050, which is 0.7 year less than EPC and EC (2008) projection. 
The LE of a 65 year old-person is 22.3 years for the year 2065, which is a year less 
than corresponding demographic projection by Burcin, Kuþera (2004). 
To test the sensitivity in case of opting-out, we have used other two variants 
of life expectancy. The longer variant prolongs the LE, while the shorter variant 
shortens it. Departure of both variants from the base projection will be 0.7 year in 
2050. The same concept was used by the EPC and EC (2008) which tested a variant 
of increased life expectancy at birth by one year by 2060 compared to the baseline 
projection. In our model instead of using sex-specific life expectancies we use unisex 
life expectancy as such practice better reflects the shape of newly launched capitaliz-
ing pillars in EU (e.g. Hungary, Poland or Slovak Republic – for basic description of 
their pension systems see OECD, 2009c). Individually applied variants of LE are 
graphically represented in the Figure 1, full figures are presented in the Appendix on 
the journal web page. 
3.2.7 System of the Income Redistribution in Paid Out Pensions (rh, rr)
Pension systems play important re-distributive role as well. The redistributive 
function of the Czech system is captured by three factors – the basic income level, 
which is uniform for all pensioners, and two reductions limits that influence income- 
-related part of the pension. We assume that adjustment of three basic parameters 
allows us to model future income redistribution within the  first pillar. The  basic 
variant assumes that the current level of the basic amount, the first and the second 
reduction limits are fully adjusted according to the inflation rate and partially (75%) 
Table 3  Potential Development of Life Expectancy at the Age 65 in the CR 
Year  Source of data  MALES  FEMALES  UNISEX 
2006  CSO  14.79  18.01  16.54 
2050  EPC and EC  19.70  23.00  21.50 
2065A  BezdČk  21.58  24.90  23.29 
2051B  BezdČk  27.92  30.14  28.98 
Notes:(1) UNISEX data are calculated as weighted arithmetic mean (where available) for males and females. 
(2) 2065A – calculated as ”current life tables“ for the year 2065. 
(3) 2051B – calculated as ”generation life tables“ for persons born in 2051. 
Source: CSO (2007); EPC and EC (2008); BezdČk et al. (2005). 
9 Life insurance companies base their calculations of life annuities on a conversion of current (cross-sec-
tional) life tables into generation (cohort) tables, which increases the life expectancy by about 5 years
(BezdČk et.al., 2005). Finance a úvČr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 4                                           319 
 
according to an increase in real wages. Together with this variant, two additional 
variants are tested. One of them is called Redistributive, in which the present redis-
tribution role of pensions is strengthened. Differentiation variant allows for a gradual 
weakening of income redistribution. Projections of the adjustment method are sum-
marized in the Table 4. 
3.3 Behavioral Factors that Influence the Decision of an Individual to Opt-out 
In addition to the above mentioned factors – which are relatively easy to quan-
tify – a host of other factors will influence an individual in his/her decision-making 
about opting-out. Some of them are related to the above mentioned, others are quali-
tative (behavioral) and so they are difficult to quantify. The following section de-
scribes some of the most relevant factors.  
When assessing the  advantages of opting-out we rely on the  rationality of 
an individual. Thaler, Benartzi (2004) argue that we should consider individuals 
bounded as rational. The problem solution is a hard one even for an economist and 
individuals may not be able to evaluate the entire range of aspects influencing opt- 
-out. There are a number of behavioural factors that can influence opt-out decision, 
the most decisive are: 
 – Individual’s preferences regarding diversification of the pension portfolio. A de-
cision of an individual to opt-out will be also affected by his/her personal prefer-
ences for the diversification of the pension portfolio. It can be characterized as 
positive insurance benefits from diversification (Brugavini, Disney, 1995). On 












unmodified (based on CSO)
 
Source: CSO (2007); own modification. 
 
Table 4  Provision for a Growth in Real Wage in Indexation of Parameters in the First 
Pillar 
a
  Basic amount 
of pension  First reduction  Second 
reduction 
Basic variant  75%  75%  75% 
Redistributive variant  140%  60%  0% 
Differentiation variant  0%  75%  150% 
Note: 
a Particular variants lead in the long run (2050) to similar replacement ratio of average wage earner. Vari-
ants mainly differ in change of the equivalency between contributions and benefits. While the Re-
distributive variant decreases income differences among individual pensions, the Differentiation variant 
does the opposite.  
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the  other hand, these benefits may not offset the  transaction costs of entry to 
the private schemes (Disney et al., 2001). With regard to the outlook of the Czech 
pension system it can be expected that individuals with a higher income will tend 
to diversify. 
 – Lack of or inaccuracy of available information due to an insufficient or inaccurate 
presentation from the government, deceptive (misleading) campaigns of opposing 
political parties, or the influence of influential interest groups (such as promotion 
of pension savings providers). 
 – Risk aversion. Persons with a strong risk aversion can choose to remain in the first 
pillar, because they think that the FDC pillar is too risky. Risk aversion can be 
higher in older persons who approach the  retirement age (they distrust private 
pension saving providers due to recent experiences). On the other hand, Dusek, 
Kopecsni (2008) show that inherent riskiness of often-reformed public PAYG 
systems is comparable to risks associated with private systems. 
 – Influence of leading members of the community on the decision of an individual. 
(Demonstration or hallo effects when a person imitates the decision of others who 
are in a different income bracket or belong to a different age group. Sometimes 
there is a trend towards family decisions, if the household head decides for all 
household members. 
All these influences can result in considerable differences between the final 
number of opted-out persons and our presented estimates.
10 Thanks to their certain 
contradictory character, it is not possible to accurately predict their overall effect. As 
we stated above, we have introduced these factors into our model as Rationality 
index  (RI).  For the  purpose of subsequent sensitivity analysis we use three basic 
values of RI. The basic variant presumes no other than pure financial (or rational) 
factors and RI = 1. But individuals could be motivated to opt-out even when their 
gain from FDC pillar is less than the loss from PAYG. For that case we use RI = 0.95 
(we call such variant “a low risk aversion”). On the other hand, Palacios, Whitehouse 
(1998) argue that for people (especially low-income workers) the future (small) gain 
from switching to FDC would not overcome the cost of the decision (information 
cost, charges and risk). For that variant we use RI = 1.05 (we call such variant “a high 
risk aversion”). 
4. Results of Opt-out Simulation 
In the previous section we have identified the series of variables used in our 
models. This section is dedicated to the results of modeling the advantages of opting- 
-out.
11 First the basic alternative is modeled, based on the above mentioned assump-
tions about values and development of individual parameters. The remaining section 
specifies the outcomes of values assumed by particular parameters. We should stress 
that sensitivity of the opt-out advantages to a change in (setting) these parameters is 
considered more significant than any concrete values (advantages for given groups of 
persons). The basic variant of parameters setting is summarized in the Table 5. 
10 The assumption is confirmed by the case of Slovakia, where many more persons decided to opt out than
estimated. Potential consequence can be a recent reopening of the second pillar, which represents a marked 
change of the proposed system. 
11 The detailed presentation of results is available on the journal web page.  Finance a úvČr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 4                                           321 
 
Although there are several possibilities how to analyze the influence of above 
factors, we present our results using one graph. For more detailed analysis we refer to 
figures and tables in Appendix, additional information is available from the corre-
sponding authors upon request. The presented Figure 2 shows for which income per-
centile it is advantageous to opt-out, depending on the number of years remaining to 
the retirement age limit. Advantages are shown separately for males and females. 
As seen from the Figure 2 and Table 6, under basic setting opting-out is ad-
vantageous only for a relatively small group of persons. It is only applicable to men 
and especially to women in the highest income percentiles. The figure shape suggests 
that the advantages of opt-out for individual percentiles vary according to the number 
of years before retirement. However this dependence is not linear. The number of 
persons for whom it is advantageous to opt-out drops first. With the increasing time 
period of a person to the retirement age it starts to grow.
12 It is understandable that 
a  maximum number of people for whom the  opt-out is cost-effective is found in 
the youngest age bracket.  
Figure 2  For Which Income Percentile It Is Advantageous to Opt-Out (basic variant) 
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Table 5  Basic Variant of Assumption about Further Development of Significant 
Parameters
Phase of pension assets creation – fund type 




1 Real return rate (in %, after 
deducting administrative costs) 
  3.5   2.2    1.0    1.0 
2020  2030  2040  2050  2 Development of unisex life 
expectancy at 65 years   22.6  23.2  23.8  24.4 
Males  Females  3 Share of non-contributory 
periods in FDC (from the total of 
40 years of gainful employment) 10%  10% 
4 FDC contribution rate (opted 
out of PAYG DB)  6% 
Basic amount of pension  First reduction  Second 
reduction 
5 Allowance for the growth 
in real wage for indexing some 
parameters in the first pillar  75%  75%  75% 
Source: Authors. 
12 It is manifested by the fact that the first income percentile for which it is advantageous to opt-out is de-
creasing.  322                                  Finance a úvČr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 4 
 
Among main reasons which determine such shape can be found:  
(1) The convergence of the Czech economy to the EU countries results in a fast- 
er wage growth in the first years of the modeled period (real growth of aver- 
age wage in 2015 is 2.8%, contrary to 2.1% in 2050). This causes higher IRR of 
the PAYG DB pillar compared to FDC and subsequently results in the constant 
(or slightly decreasing) number of individuals who would opt-out. The influ-
ence of the convergence is substantial mainly with individuals who switch 1 to 
15 years before retirement. With the period closer to the year 2050 this argu-
ment is fading. 
(2) The lower real rate of return (FDC) makes the “opt-out curve” rather flatter for 
people who switched a few years before their retirement. The advantage of long 
term savings belongs only to young and middle age generation. 
(3) Growing life expectancy lowers pensions from the FDC pillar. This fact does not 
envisage direct influence of the pension from PAYG DB model. However, in re-
ality this might be one of the main factors in the long run. Such argument may 
explain why the “opt out curve” declines quite gently for people switching 30 to 
40 years before their retirement.  
Similar shape of the  “opt-out curve” for countries which introduced FDC 
pillar can be found in Palacios, Whitehouse (1998). While our “opt-out curve” pre-
dicts the number of individuals who would opt-out, Palacios and Whitehouse present 
real shares of opted-out individuals in total. 
To show the influence of the factors, we perform the sensitivity analysis. In 
the  following section we present the  results only for the  parameters which have 
a remarkable impact on the opt-out rate. Other graphs showing various aspects of 
opting-out can be found in the Appendix. The most interesting is the difference in 
the total replacement ratio for the males according to time to retirement (total opted- 
-out pensions minus non-opted-out pension). The Figure 3 compares the two replace-
ment rates and the results are presented separately for three wage levels. This graph 
might be seen as a comparison of the reform scenario with the no-reform scenario. 
But the reader should be aware of the fact that results for the no-reform strategy are 
only approximate, as we are not able to anticipate the (political) setting of the PAYG 
DB pillar in the long run. The figure logically complements the presented figure 
showing the  (dis)advantage rate of opting-out for selected income percentiles. If 
opting-out is mandatory for all, this figure illustrates varying income distribution of 
pension benefits in connection with the opt-out. 
Table 6  Growth (+) and Drop (-) in the Gross Replacement Rate of the Opted-Out 
Pension in Comparison with the Non-Opted-Out Pension for Some Income 
Percentiles [% of the pre-retirement wage]
Males  Females 
W
i
2020  2030  2040  2050  2020  2030  2040  2050 
W
10  -1.9  -3.8  -5.2  -6.1  -2.8  -5.5  -7.7  -9.3 
W
25  -1.3  -2.5  -3.4  -3.8  -2.0  -3.9  -5.3  -6.2 
W
50  -0.8  -1.5  -1.8  -1.5  -1.2  -2.4  -3.2  -3.5 
W
75  -0.1  -0.2  0.0  0.8  -0.7  -1.3  -1.4  -1.1 
W
90  0.4  0.9  1.6  2.7  -0.1  -0.1  0.2  1.0 
Source: Authors. Finance a úvČr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 4                                           323 
4.1 Sensitivity of Results in the Basic Variant of Parameters to a Gradual 
Change in the Following Parameters 
4.1.1 Real Rate of Return 
If the estimated rate of return grows as compared to the basic variant, (by 1% 
in all phases) the number of persons for whom the opt-out is advantageous grows 
slightly. The proportion certainly increases in time (it means that the opt-out is best 
for the young who will retire in 30 or more years). 
By contrast a decreasing rate of return (by 1% against the basic variant), which 
corresponds to the variant with a lower rate of return of assets (see Table 1) leads to 
a situation where a number of opted-out persons is negligible. Thus it can be con-
cluded that with a  declining assets appreciation, the  number of opted-out persons 
decreases significantly (see Figure 4).  
4.1.2 Life Expectancy 
Regarding the life expectancy we ran the sensitivity tests only for FDC pillar 
(PAYG DB pillar being fixed). The impact of life expectancy on the proportion of 
opt-outs is then unambiguous – the shorter the life expectancy at 65, the more job-
holders will opt-out from the first pillar. The effect of this parameter is prominent: 
the number of persons who opt-out grows by 5% for each year by which the life ex-
pectancy is lower. Similar principle applies when the life expectancy increases. Due 
to the fact that changes in the life expectancy influence PAYG DB pension also, we 
can conclude that impact of this factor is rather minor (see Figure 5). 
4.1.3 Duration of Non-contributory Periods in the FDC 
Extension of the period of inactivity results in the drop of the number of peo-
ple who would opt-out (for detailed results see Figure 6). If we suppose that women 
will be inactive for the period of 20% (instead of 10 % in the basic variant) of their 
working life, the opt-out becomes disadvantageous. If we suppose that a jobholder 
has no period of inactivity in the course of his/her working life, the advantage of opt- 
-out will be more prominent (especially for males – opt-out is advantageous for al-
most of half of them). The rules for inactivity periods are set by the state and they 
directly influence the advantage of opt-out for people who are at or slightly above 
the average wage. Indirect reduction of non-contributory period can be regarded as 
Figure 3  Difference in the Total Replacement Ratio for Males According to Time 
to Retirement 
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prolonging statutory pension age – an individual has to work longer with the same 
PAYG DB pension and increases FDC pension. 
4.1.4 Effects of the Real Wage Growth in Indexation of Some Parameters 
of the First Pillar 
First pillar setting and parameter indexation (see Table 4) play an important 
role for the degree of opting-out in various groups of persons. If the first pillar was 
Figure 4  Opt-Out Rate in Men and Women with Differing Appreciation Rate
          Higher return variant                                         Lower return variant 
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Figure 5  Opt-Out Rate in Men and Women for Different Life Expectancies 
          Shorter variant                                                  Longer variant 
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Figure 6  Opt-Out Rate of Men and Women in Case of Different Non-Contributory 
Periods
         Higher level of inactivity (20% ncp)                 Zero inactivity (0% ncp) 
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markedly redistributive, the  number of persons who opt-out would increase. This 
growth would be accompanied by a slight drop in the replacement ratio as well as by 
a lesser degree of pension distribution (see Figure 7). On the contrary, a low degree 
of pension redistribution in the first pillar would not change the proportion of opted- 
-out persons very much (in comparison with the basic variant).  
4.1.5 Sensitivity to Individual Rationality 
Individual rationality seems to be the most important factor which influences 
the number of opted-out persons (for detailed results see Figure 8). We have set the level 
of rationality index (RI) to 0.95 and 1.05 respectively. This setting is rather arbitrary. 
In our view the width span of RI is quite narrow for persons below the age of 50. (We 
might mention that the probability that a person at the age of 60 dies before reaching 
retirement age is higher than 5%). This might be supported by the fact that no one 
can predict the level of pension from PAYG DB in the 15 year horizon. Narrowing 
interval for the two levels of RI is influenced by the way we have applied RI in 
the model. If we used RI only for the fractional pension which resulted from the opt- 
-out, it would make the interval narrow even for the persons who are just before their 
retirement age. High sensitivity to RI factor can give a partial answer to the ques- 
Figure 7  Proportion of Opted Out Males and Females for a Various Setting 
of the First Pillar 
          Differentiation variant                                         Redistributive variant 
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Figure 8  Proportion of Opted-out Males and Females for a Various Setting 
of the Rationality Index 
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tion why more Slovaks opted-out than it had been predicted by model calculations 
(MPSVR SR, 2007). 
It may be rather surprising that the variant „low risk aversion“ is increasing 
the number of the opted-outs up to 100% in case of age cohorts switching just before 
their retirement. As a result of later retirement age, in case of switching, the number 
of individuals willing to opt-out is decreasing. This is a consequence of the fact that 
the rationality index is applicable to the total amount of PAYG DB pension. It may 
lead to a  situation that the  individual who is switching a  couple of years before 
the retirement is facing the lower loss of PAYG DB than corresponds to 5% RI in-
fluence. In such case the individual always opts-out, ignoring the impact of other 
parameters. The  test could be modified as to compare only potential losses from 
the PAYG system and potential gains from the FDC system in the case of opt-out. If 
this is the case, the “risk aversion” curves in the Figure 8 would converge more 
closely to the basic variant opt-out schedule. However, we believe that individual 
choice would be based more on comparing the  total value of pension, not incre-
mental losses and gains even though it may lead to paradoxical results for individuals 
few years before their retirement.
13  
5. Conclusions 
Experience from the countries which have carried out the pension system re-
form shows that the decision about the form of pension system is primarily political. 
When analyzing expectations of pension scheme expenditure in 17 OECD countries, 
Schneider points out that the influence of economic factors on occurrence of pension 
reforms is unconvincing. He follows “that governments do react to expectations of 
increasing pension expenditures, but they are unmoved by the level of [current] pen-
sion expenditures” (Schneider, 2009:305). In our article we start from a simple pro-
position that the  decision about the  move toward the  capital pillar in the  Czech 
Republic has been done. Our objective then was to formulate the way how to carry 
out the transformation. We differentiated between the opt-out form, when individual 
can decide whether and how to participate in the reform, and the form of state con-
trolled transformation, when all decisions on the shape of transformation are given 
by the state on behalf of an individual.  
Our paper then focused on the issue of the proportion of the Czech population 
who will decide to opt-out from PAYG DB to FDC when they are allowed. Our analy-
sis is based on micro-simulation model in which we compare pension of the  in-
dividual whose pension is opted-out with the pension of the same individual in case 
(s)he stays only in the PAYG DB pension pillar. In the year 2010 only around 20% to 
30% of men with highest salaries (resp. 8% to 12% for women) would opt-out to 
a multi-pillar scheme. This result is valid only under the assumption of rationality 
and long run predictability of most parameters. Our results are consistent with the cal-
culations made by BezdČk Commission which claimed that approximately 50% of 
men and less than 10% of women will opt-out (see BezdČk et al., 2005:23 and 37). 
13 For example, worker on the 20th percentil and 5 years prior retirement would lose by 50% more in
the PAYG than he/she would gain in the FDC system. Therefore, when comparing gains and losses, he/she
would probably never consider opting-out. However, his/her pension would fall after opt-out by 1.3% only: 
a loss he/she can easily choose to ignore. Finance a úvČr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 4                                           327 
The sensitivity analysis showed that the rate of real return of the pension as-
sets is the most influential parameter. Higher appreciation rate make opt-out more 
favorable for more than 70% of the men and almost 50% of the women who are 
entering labor market. Similar analysis for the Czech Republic was made by Ježek 
(2003). His results do not clearly show the number of people who would opt-out, as 
the outcome of his model is the so-called switching wage. It states from which wage 
level it would be profitable for an individual to opt-out in the year 2005. In all anal-
yzed variants he shows that the level of switching wage is lower than the basic 
variant in our model. Our model shows similar results only when the variant where 
the pension funds realize higher real rate of return of pension actives is applied. This 
example implies that the difference between Ježek´s and our results is mainly given 
by the set-up of parameters. Relaxing the condition that the individual’s decision is 
done only under strict rational arguments induces that opt-out might be favorable for 
significantly larger proportion of the population. Therefore, based on full rationality 
we suppose that number of people who will opt-out will be higher than predicted by 
BezdČk Commission or by our calculation. 
We believe that our estimates are supported by the Slovak Republic’s expe-
rience. Their first calculations underestimated the real number of people who have 
opted-out. We argue that such irrational behavior can be explained by two argu-
ments: (1) in case when long run financial sustainability of the first pillar (PAYG 
DB) is unpredictable or unwarrantable, it might be wise for everybody to diversify 
the future pension, (2) individual thinks of pension savings as personal assets which 
may be inherited, whereas future pension from PAYG DB might be rather uncer-
tain.
14 The question is whether it is possible to implement such behavioral factors 
into mathematical model. 
We should also ask what the consequences of an individual’s irrational de-
cision might be in the reform as far as the opt-out is concerned. The more persons 
opt-out, the higher share of implicit pension debt is transformed into explicit debt. 
This might cause problems in a public debt management. To what extent are these 
problems crucial so that the concept of transformation using opt-out can be refused? 
The vital factor for this decision is the level of the opt-out insurance rate, because 
higher insurance rates will enlarge the problems and vice versa. Even if the problem 
of transformation costs has been put aside in our analysis, we believe that the realiza-
tion of the way of transformation we are suggesting would not cause serious pro-
blems to the Czech public finance, not even in the situation in which a larger number 
of people than estimated in the model would opt-out. Moreover, the model showed 
the fact that potential decrease in pensions by some individuals is not of such extent 
which would make the state solve the outcomes by some systemic measures.  
A more rigid (controlled) transformation, with no voluntary opt-out and with 
strict age limits for switch to the new system – along the lines of reforms in Poland or 
Chile – might decrease uncertainty during the reform and might limit the scope for ir-
rational decision by individuals. However, the government is able to limit uncertainty 
and irrationality only if it can correctly predict developments of main economic and 
14 This argument might be supported by Dušek, Kopecsni (2008:342) who proved that the policy risk of 
the PAYG system in three central European countries (Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic) can be 
substantial.  328                                  Finance a úvČr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 4 
demographic parameters and then commit itself to a consistent reform policy over 
a longer term. The recent Czech experience warns that these conditions for consistent 
government policies might be too strict. If so, we cannot claim that the controlled 
transformation is more appropriate than the opt-out version. In such case it is impos-
sible to predict the reform strategy which would lead to a more efficient outcome. 
 
APPENDIX 
Models Used in Our Analysis  
1. PAYG DB Model 
Calculation of the new acknowledged pension is done by using the current prac-
tice in the CR (according to Section 33–36 of the Act No. 155/1995, Coll.). The equa-
tions (1)–(5) also uses BezdČk (2005), the philosophy of the calculation can be found 
in MLSA (2008:94–96). 
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(1)  Pension is composed of two elements (a dual component structure):  
BA – basic amount (flat rate) and 
i PA  – a percentage-based assessment based on the insured period and earnings 
achieved. 
(2)  The amount of PA depends on personal insurance period ( 1 40
i n   ), “entitle-
ment” ( 1,5% ar   ) and personal calculation base (
i CB ). 
(3)  Personal calculation base is given by personal assessment base and reduction 
limits ( 1231 2 ,,,, rr rr rr rh rh ). 
(4)  Personal assessment base depends on annual bases (
i
k AB ) within the reference 







   ).  Finance a úvČr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 4                                           329 
(5)  We simplifies the personal assessment base with the personal monthly wage prior 
retirement. 
 
Share of opted-out pension from PAYG on total (potential) PAYG pension is 
calculated as (6) 
                           
1
6
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Where 
i
FDC n  is the saving period in FDC system,  FDC cr  is the opted-out contribution 
rate (set at 6%) and 
i T  corresponds with the restriction of pension rights from PAYG 
DB system in case that individual chooses to opt-out. If 
i T >1, than the system finan-
cially penalize the individuals who have chosen to opt-out. We set 
i T =1. 
2. FDC Model 
FDC micro-simulation model has two parts (phases) – saving and pay-out 
phases. The equations of the model are based on insurance-mathematical relations 
(the saved amount and the present value of future payments are equal): 
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S
i – value of pension actives of an individual (i
th income percentile) at the moment 
of retirement  
i
j W  – monthly salary of i
th income percentile in the year j of work career 
FDC cr  – contribution rate to the FDC system ( FDC cr = 6%) 
n1 – saving period (n1 = 40) 
k S  – inflation rate in the year k 
k r  – real appreciation rate in the year k 
ncp  – the share of non-contributory period within the saving period 
2.2 Pay-out Phase 
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i
RA NV   net present value of future paid pensions (individual in percentile i, at 
the time of retirement – Y) 
i
FDC P   the first assessed pension at the time of retirement (monthly)  330                                  Finance a úvČr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 4 
n2  the life expectancy at the time of retirement (length of pay-out phase) 
m v   pension adjustment in the beginning of the year (m+ 1) after the retirement 
m S   inflation rate in the year m after the retirement 
m r   the real rate of return in the year m after the retirement 
 
Pension adjustment 





v S                                                (10) 
1 m rw    the real growth of the average wage in the year (m – 1) 
Pension adjustment follows the Section 67 of the Act No. 155/1995, Coll. Since the rule 
of pension adjustment does not influence 
i
RA NV , the rule from the PAYG DB pensions 
is used for convenience. 
3. Projection of the Income Differentiation until 2050 
















                                          (11) 







                                                     (12) 
Income differentiation is measured by the “decile ratio” (the share of the ninth 
to the first income decile).  2008 DR  is given by the CSO (2009),  2050 DR  is our “desired” 
ratio in 2050 (at the level of 3.5). 










   ¨¸ «» ¨¸
©¹ «»
¬¼
                                             (13) 
rw denote average real growth of the average wage between 2008 and 2050. 
                         2008 1 1
2009





WW r w i x S 
 
ªº      ¬¼                       (14) 
Formula (14) expresses the projection of wages according to desired develop-
ment of the Income Differentiation. We assume that the wage growth until 2050 of 
the 67th income percentile will be the same as the wage growth of the average wage 
(more or less true for the years 1993–2007). We apply “the correction coefficient of 
the wage growth – x“ for other income percentiles. The higher (lower) income percen-
tile (compared to the 67th income percentile), the more important role plays the “cor-
rection coefficient of the wage growth“. For simplification and convenience we have 
replaced  j rw  with rw in the formulas (15) and (16), which has helped us to find “the cor-
rection coefficient of the wage growth“. Finance a úvČr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 4                                           331 
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42 2050
2009
1 (90 67)* 1 (90 67)*
1 (10 67)* 1 (10 67)* j
rw x rw x
rw x rw x  
ªº   §·   ¬¼    ¨¸ ¨¸ ªº   ©¹ ¬¼
                   (15) 
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